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ost economic research treats the household as a 
single agent assuming that individuals within 
the household share the same preferences or 
there is a household “head” who has the final say. This 
simple framework has proved immensely useful; despite a 
common misperception, it can explain many differences 
in well-being or consumption patterns within households. 
Nonetheless, recent empirical research demonstrates that 
this “unitary” household model is not appropriate in a 
variety of settings in both developed and developing 
countries. 
 The unitary model’s shortcomings are relevant to 
policymakers since it is frequently the basis of research 
used to inform policy decisions. Policies that are designed 
based on the presumption of a unitary model may fail in 
settings where it does not hold. For example, the unitary 
model predicts that resources within households are 
pooled together and therefore the identity of the recipient 
of (public) transfers to a household does not matter. If this 
is not the case, policies that ignore the identity of the 
recipient or simply target transfers or interventions to the 
household as a whole may not yield the desired results. 
Lastly, acknowledging more complicated household 
decisionmaking processes actually enables additional 
policy levers that can be brought to bear on development 
problems. While the unitary model predicts that 
intrahousehold behavior can be changed only by changes 
in prices and household incomes, alternative models 
suggest that many other mechanisms can do so, such as 
changes in access to common property resources, credit, 
public works schemes, and legal 
and institutional rights. 
 Both theoretical concerns 
and empirical evidence have cast 
doubt on the unitary model, 
spawning a variety of alternative 
models of the household that 
focus on the individuality of 
household members. Among these are so-called collective 
models that allow differing preferences and only assume 
that allocations result in Pareto-efficient outcomes, where 
it would not be possible to increase the welfare of one 
individual without reducing that of another. A common 
interpretation for collective models is that there is 
(cooperative) bargaining within the household. This paper 
exploits that interpretation to construct, and carry out, a 
test of the unitary household model. The basic insight is 
that if preferences are different and there is bargaining, 
household decisions will vary according to the relative 
strengths of individuals’ “bargaining power.” 
 Measuring individual bargaining power can be quite 
difficult, however. Attempts to do so in the economics 
literature have focused on control over economic 
resources. Candidate proxies for bargaining power have 
included (1) public provision of resources to a particular 
member of the household and exogenous policy changes 
that affect the intrahousehold distribution of these 
resources; (2) shares of income earned by women; (3) 
unearned income; (4) current assets (5) inherited assets; 
and (6) assets at marriage. Any of the above measures 
might proxy for bargaining power if, for example, the 
threat of withdrawing both oneself and one’s assets from 
the household grants the owner of those assets some 
power over household decisionmaking. 
 We apply a single methodological framework to test 
the unitary model in four countries with very different 
social and economic conditions: Bangladesh, Ethiopia, 
Indonesia, and South Africa. These tests are conducted 
using four data sets that have been specifically designed 
by the International Food Policy Research Institute to 
examine intrahousehold allocation and draw on 
qualitative information to create culturally specific but 
quantifiable indicators of bargaining power based on 
assets that husband and wife brought to the marriage. 
Applying the common framework to the design and 
analysis of household surveys while paying attention to 
country-specific nuances has provided many important 
insights. For example, 
although women appear 
to bring far fewer assets 
to the marriage, the role 
these assets play in 
household decisionmak-
ing varies substantially 
across countries. 
 Specifically, we test whether assets brought to 
marriage by each spouse have differential effects on 
household-level and individual-level outcomes. The 
household-level outcomes are expenditure shares of food, 
education, health, children’s clothing, and alcohol and/or 
tobacco. The individual-level outcomes analyzed are two 
measures of educational attainment: the deviation of the 
child’s completed schooling from the cohort mean, and 
years of schooling completed. 
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“Across countries, the most consistent 
effect is that higher relative resources 
controlled by women tend to increase the 
shares spent on education.”  
 The results for the expenditure share analysis show 
that the unitary model of the household is, on the whole, 
rejected, in all four countries. This finding is stronger in 
the Asian countries than in the African ones, however. 
Across countries, the most consistent effect is that higher 
relative resources controlled by women tend to increase 
the shares spent on education. While it is tempting to say 
that mothers are more altruistic than fathers, this behavior 
may have a sound economic basis. Since women are 
younger at marriage and expect to live longer, they may 
invest in the education of their children more heavily 
since they are more likely to rely on them for old age 
support. Furthermore, in societies where key assets that 
assure lifetime consumption-smoothing are controlled by 
men, women may attempt to meet the same long-term 
needs with other instruments, such as investment in the 
human capital of healthy and educated children. 
 To explore how the increased resources devoted to 
education play out in the household, we examine 
educational outcomes for children. The results for both 
schooling outcomes provide further evidence against the 
unitary model. However, the patterns underlying the 
earlier results differ substantially across the case studies.  
 In both Bangladesh and South Africa there is 
evidence that more assets in the hands of women have a 
positive impact on the educational budget shares. Yet, in 
Bangladesh, father’s schooling (for the 6-10 year olds) 
and assets (for the 11-15 year olds) have a negative 
impact on girls’ schooling, whereas in South Africa it is 
the opposite. Father’s schooling has a positive effect on 
girls’ schooling while mother’s assets have a negative 
impact. In South Africa, the pattern may be partly 
justified using the old-age security hypothesis outlined 
earlier—mothers favor sons who are more likely to 
provide for them—but in Bangladesh, different 
preferences are more likely the underlying cause. 
Wealthier Bangladeshi fathers may attach a higher
premium to marrying their daughters off earlier, an effect 
opposite to that of better-educated mothers. 
 Nevertheless, programs designed to transfer assets to 
women should be carefully scrutinized. First, while more 
assets in the hands of women lead to higher budget shares 
for education, the beneficiaries of these gains are different 
across countries. These differences appear to be driven by 
both differences in preferences and underlying economic 
rationales. An understanding of the latter is an important 
ingredient into policymaking aimed at exploiting these 
differences. Second, different types of assets may have 
different implications for bargaining power if “status” or 
prestige is attached to a particular asset. Indeed, the 
special meaning or significance attached to ritual transfers 
such as dowries or bride price should warn us against 
asset-transfer interventions that are designed without 
paying attention to cultural contexts. Lastly, we must also 
remember the possibility of compensatory (or even 
retaliatory) action by nonrecipients.  
 Results also show that influences on intrahousehold 
allocation are operating at different levels, with different 
implications for policy. In the Ethiopian case, site-specific 
characteristics, ethnicity, and religious differences have a 
stronger effect than husband’s or wife’s assets. This 
indicates that variations across communities and ethnic 
groups may be larger than variations in the asset position 
of men and women within those groups. In this case, legal 
reforms that affect property rights across groups might 
have larger impact on intrahousehold allocation than re-
distribution within each group. In the Bangladesh case, on 
the other hand, differences in asset positions of men and 
women within sites are large enough to warrant inter-
ventions to increase women’s assets relative to men’s.  
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